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Banks face a tradeoﬀ between diversifying and focusing their loan portfolio. In this
paper we carry out an empirical study for the German market to shed light on the
question whether or not the beneﬁts of risk sharing outweigh those of specialization.
We use data from the Bundesbank’s quarterly borrowers statistic to determine the
degree of diversiﬁcation in the banks’ loan portfolios and combine this data with
the banks’ balance sheets and audit reports. The unique database comprises data
from all German banks during the period from 1993 to 2003.
Our main results can be summarized in three statements: i) Specialized banks have
a slightly higher return than diversiﬁed banks. ii) Specialized banks have lower
relative loan loss provisions and lower shares of non-performing loans, iii) However,
the standard deviations of the loan loss provision ratio and the non-performing loan
ratio are lower for diversiﬁed banks.
Keywords: bank lending, loan portfolio, portfolio theory, diversiﬁcation, risk-
return analysis
JEL classiﬁcation: G11, G21, C23, C43Non technical summary
Should a bank diversify its loan portfolio as much as possible or should it concentrate
its lending to those industries in which it has special expertise? If the expected return
and the risk of a loan were completely exogenous, the answer would clearly be in
favour of the risk diversiﬁcation as we know it from the stock markets. However,
to some extent a bank can inﬂuence the risk-return-characteristics of its loans. For
instance, the bank determines the eﬀort for screening and monitoring of its debtors.
By building up expertise in a certain industry, a bank can tell more easily good
debtors from bad ones and can thereby reduce the risk of originated loans. The
specialization, however, comes along with a loss of portfolio diversiﬁcation across
industries.
The question from above (diversiﬁcation vs. specialization) has no unambiguous
theoretical solution, because the eﬀects work in opposite directions. Therefore, we
examine this question in an empirical study. Our dataset consists of data for all
the banks in Germany in the period from 1993 to 2003. In our dataset the lending
is broken down to industries at the bank-level. We calculate diﬀerent measures of
diversiﬁcation for each bank and each year. These measures of diversiﬁcation are
then related to return and risk ﬁgures of the banks.
The results of our empirical study can be summarized as follows: more specialized
banks tend to have a slightly higher return, measured as proﬁts over equity and total
assets, respectively, than more diversiﬁed banks. However, the slightly higher return
comes along with a slightly higher risk, which we measure as the serial volatility of
the non-performing loans ratio. To sum up, focused banks enjoy a slightly better
return performance, but their non-performing loans ratio is a bit more volatile.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Soll eine Bank ihr Kreditportfolio m¨ oglichst breit streuen, oder soll sie sich bei der
Kreditvergabe auf diejenigen Branchen konzentrieren, in denen sie ¨ uber besondere
Kompentenz verf¨ ugt? W¨ aren der erwartete Ertrag und das Risiko ihrer Kredite nur
durch ¨ außere Umst¨ ande bestimmt, dann m¨ usste die Antwort eindeutig zugunsten der
Risikodiversiﬁkation ausfallen, wie wir sie etwa von den Aktienm¨ arkten her kennen.
Jedoch kann die Bank zu einem gewissen Grad selbst die Ertrags- und Risikomerk-
male eines Kredits beeinﬂussen, indem sie etwa festgelegt, wie genau sie ihre Kredit-
nehmer pr¨ uft und ¨ uberwacht. Indem also eine Bank besondere Kompentenz in einer
Branche aufbaut, kann sie bei den potenziellen Kreditnehmern aus dieser Branche
leichter gute von schlechten Schuldnern unterscheiden und so das Risiko des einzel-
nen vergebenen Kredits senken; sie verliert dabei aber die M¨ oglichkeit, das Risiko
ihres Gesamtportfolios ¨ uber die Branchen zu streuen.
Theoretisch l¨ asst sich die oben gestellte Frage (Diversiﬁkation vs. Spezialisierung)
somit nicht eindeutig beantworten; in diesem Papier soll sie daher empirisch unter-
sucht werden. Wir verwenden dazu einen Datensatz f¨ ur die Banken in Deutschland,
der auf der Ebene der einzelnen Bank eine Aufgliederung des Kreditvolumens in die
einzelnen Branchen erlaubt. Wir berechnen f¨ ur jede Bank und jedes Jahr des Un-
tersuchungszeitraums (1993-2003) Maße f¨ ur die Diversiﬁkation des Kreditportfolios
und setzen diese Maße in Beziehung zu Ertrags- und Risikokennziﬀern der einzelnen
Banken.
Die empirischen Ergebnisse unserer Studie lassen sich folgendermaßen zusammen-
fassen: Banken mit einem h¨ oheren Grad an Spezialisierung erreichen einen leicht
h¨ oheren Ertrag, gemessen als Jahres¨ uberschuss bezogen auf das Eigenkapital bzw.
die Bilanzsumme, als Banken mit einem st¨ arker diversiﬁzierten Portfolio. Allerdings
zeigt sich, dass der h¨ ohere Ertrag mit einem leicht h¨ oheren Risiko einhergeht, wenn
das Risiko als zeitliche Schwankung der Kreditvorsorgequote einer Bank gemessen
wird. Demnach erkaufen die spezialisierten Banken ihren leicht h¨ oheren Ertrag mit
einem etwas h¨ oheren Risiko im Vergleich zu den diversiﬁzierten Banken.Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Related Literature 2
3 Data 4
3.1 Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 Diversiﬁcation and Risk-Return-Characteristics 8
4.1 Heuristic Concepts of Diversiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2 Diversiﬁcation and Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3 Diversiﬁcation and Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5 Empirical Results 16
5.1 Diversiﬁcation and Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2 Diversiﬁcation and Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6 Conclusion 25Diversiﬁcation and the Banks’
Risk-Return-Characteristics – Evidence from
Loan Portfolios of German Banks∗
1 Introduction
Should a bank diversify its loan portfolio or should a bank hand out loans only to
those ﬁrms whose business the bank is very familiar with? If a loan were a liquid
asset with exogenous payoﬀ, the question would clearly be answered in favor of risk
diversiﬁcation. However, loans cannot be traded in a liquid market and the bank
can at least in part determine the payoﬀ of the loan: Depending on its screening
and monitoring abilities, a bank can prevent or at least mitigate the information
asymmetry problems associated with the loan contract and can thereby reduce the
riskiness of the payoﬀ.
Obviously, there is a tradeoﬀ between the strategy of risk diversiﬁcation and the
strategy of building up expertise in certain industries, and it is not clear which
strategy is the better one. In the real world we observe both strategies: On the
one hand, the banking act sets upper limits for the exposure to one single borrower
which is an argument in favor of the (assumed) necessity of diversiﬁcation. On the
other hand, there are banks like the Deutsche Apotheker- und ¨ Arztebank which built
up expertise in certain industries (here the health care business) they have a superior
knowledge about, hoping that their superior monitoring abilities will increase risk-
adjusted returns. As there are various examples for banks with industry expertises,
we can conclude that focussing is at least for some banks an alternative strategy.
The main contribution of this article is an empirical study for the German banking
sector to ﬁnd out which of the two strategies, diversiﬁcation of the loan portfolio
∗ We are indebted to the discussants and participants at conferences including the 33rd Annual
Meeting of the European Finance Association (Z¨ urich, Switzerland, August 2006), the IFSAM
VIIIth World Congress (Berlin, Germany, September 2006), the 13th Annual Meeting of the
German Finance Association (Oestrich-Winkel, Germany, October 2006) and to Thomas Kick
for helpful comments on the paper. All remaining errors are of course ours.
1or its specialization, has generated better results in the past. We use data on the
loan portfolio composition of German banks and relate this data to performance
and risk measures of the corresponding banks. Our ﬁndings can be summarized as
follows: Banks which focus their lending on few industries have higher returns and
lower loan loss provision ratios respectively non-performing loan ratios, than banks
with a diversiﬁed loan portfolio. Given these results, it seems as if the strategy of
building up expertise is superior to the diversiﬁcation of loan origination. However,
the standard deviation of the loan loss provision ratio and the non-performing loan
ratio respectively as proxies for the bank’s unexpected losses are more prominent
with specialized banks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we put our paper in perspective to
the existing literature in this area. The data is presented in Section 3. Section 4 is
devoted to theoretical considerations concerning the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation and
those of being focussed. Our empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on the question whether or not to diversify does not oﬀer an
unanimous recommendation. Whereas Diamond (1984) comes to the conclusion that
a bank maximizes the gains from delegated monitoring by perfect diversiﬁcation,
Hellwig (1998) extends the Diamond (1984) model and shows that banks may be
well advised to concentrate at least on some large projects to reduce the monitoring
costs. Stomper (2004) shows in an equilibrium model that both types of banks exist
in equilibrium: those that are perfectly diversiﬁed and those that are specialized.
Winton (1999) explicitly models the tradeoﬀ between diversiﬁcation and specializa-
tion. In his model the gains from diversiﬁcation and those from focusing depend on
the riskiness of the bank. According to his model the gains from diversiﬁcation are
most dominant when the bank has a medium risk level; for low risk and for high
risk banks it pays to run a specialization strategy.
2There is a large body of empirical studies that analyzes beneﬁts from strategic
diversiﬁcation of, mostly nonﬁnancial, ﬁrms. Whereas Lang and Stulz (1994) and
Berger and Ofek (1995) ﬁnd a discount for diversiﬁed ﬁrms, Campa and Kedia (2002)
argue that this diversiﬁcation-discount is rather due to the underlying characteristics
of the diversiﬁed ﬁrms than to the decision for diversiﬁcation. Stiroh (2004) and
Laderman (2000) empirically analyze the beneﬁts from strategic diversiﬁcation in
the case of banks. According to their studies the gains from diversiﬁcation in terms
of reduced risk are only weak.
Heitﬁeld et al. (2005) analyze portfolios of Syndicated National Credits (SNC). They
show that the portfolio risk goes up when the name and industry concentration is
increased. However, their results are barely surprising because in their study the loan
parameters are exogenous and therefore the banks’ screening and monitoring abilities
remain unconsidered. The empirical study of Acharya et al. (2004) is based on the
theoretical results of Winton (1999). They analyze the portfolio diversiﬁcation as
well as risk and return ﬁgures of Italian banks and conclude that ”diversiﬁcation, per
se, is no guarantee of superior performance or greater bank safety and soundness”.
Elyasiani and Deng (2004) carry out a corresponding study for the banks in the
United States. They ﬁnd that diversiﬁed banks have lower returns, but at the same
time these banks are less risky, hinting at a typical tradeoﬀ of risk and return.
Hayden et al. (2005) perform a study close to Acharya et al. (2004) with data for
German banks. They ﬁnd that diversiﬁed banks tend to show weaker results than
specialized banks. Their study is the one most closely related to our own work.
However, our study is diﬀerent with respect to several aspects: i) We use diﬀerent
measures of diversiﬁcation. Whereas Hayden et al. (2005) use only the Hirschman-
Herﬁndahl-Index, we measure banks’ diversiﬁcation with distance measures as well.
These distance measures describe the specialization relative to a benchmark, for
instance the nationwide loan portfolio, and overcome thereby the limitations of
the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl-Index which implicitly assumes an equally distributed
benchmark.1 ii) Our database diﬀers from the database used by Hayden et al. (2005).
1 See Pﬁngsten and Rudolph (2002) and Kamp et al. (2005).
3The banks’ portfolio composition in our study is calculated from the borrowers
statistics, whereas Hayden et al. (2005) use individual loan data which is taken from
the German credit register (Millionenkredit-Evidenzzentrale). The problem with the
credit register is that it only covers loans of more than 1.5 million euros, whereas
the borrowers statistics comprises all national lending.
3 Data
In this section we give an overview of the data and the variables we use in our
empirical study. At ﬁrst we describe the German banking sector and the two prin-
cipal databases of our study (Subsection 3.1). Then we introduce the bank speciﬁc
variables (Subsection 3.2).
3.1 Databases
The German banking sector traditionally consists of three pillars: the commercial
banks, the savings banks, and the credit cooperatives. Concerning the number of
institutions, the cooperatives and the savings banks dominate the German market.
This dominance of the savings banks and especially the cooperatives persists; in
2005 they still account for more than 82% of all institutions.2 However, the last
decade saw many mergers within the groups of credit cooperatives and savings banks,
respectively.
Credit cooperatives and savings banks are allowed to oﬀer all sort of banking services,
but their business is locally restricted and, by and large, they do not compete with
banks of their own pillar. The commercial banks comprise the ﬁve big banks; the
majority of the commercial banks, however, are of medium size. All the banks in
Germany have to regularly report to the German regulatory authorities and we use
this data for our empirical analysis.
2 In September 2005, Germany had 2098 banking institutions. Among these institutions, there
were 1307 cooperative banks (62.3%), 475 savings banks and state banks (22.6%), 249 com-
mercial banks (11.9%) and 67 other banks (3.2%). The other banks include real estate banks,
building societies and special purpose banks.
4The banking data of our study is taken from two principal databases: the Kredit-
nehmerstatistik, from which we calculate the degree of diversiﬁcation in the banks’
loan portfolios, and the Bankaufsichtliches Informationssystem (BAKIS), from which
we calculate bank speciﬁc ﬁnancial indicators.
All banks in Germany have to report their loan exposure at the end of each quarter.
The Deutsche Bundesbank collects this data in the borrowers statistics (Kredit-
nehmerstatistik). The banks are required to report their loan exposure to corporate
borrowers, which are broken down into 23 industries. We use the exposures to these
industries to determine the degree of diversiﬁcation (See Subsection 4.1). The bor-
rowers statistics is limited to domestic borrowers. However, as most of the banks in
Germany have no or little foreign business (especially the credit cooperatives and
savings banks), this limitation seems not to be crucial.
The second principal database in our paper is the Bankaufsichtliches Informa-
tionssystem (BAKIS). In this database, the German supervisory authorities (the
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Ba-
Fin)) collect data used to supervise the German banks. This database contains bal-
ance sheet data and proﬁts & losses accounts of all banks in Germany. In addition,
it contains the yearly quantitative audit reports. There are yearly observations,
starting in 1993 and ending 2003, i.e. our study covers 11 years. The database
comprises the data of all German banks starting in 1993 with observations for 3,840
banks. Due to mergers the number of banks was reduced to 2,161 by the end of
2003.
3.2 Variables
In the empirical study, we explain ﬁnancial indicators by the degree of loan portfolio
diversiﬁcation and certain control variables. In what follows these bank speciﬁc
variables are deﬁned. Measures of diversiﬁcation (specialization) are described in
more detail in the following section.
To measure the size of a bank we use the natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets
5(ta). The capital ratio (cap) is deﬁned as equity over total assets.3 As the return
of a bank we calculate the return on assets (roa) and the return on equity (roe),
which is deﬁned as the bank’s proﬁt over total assets and over equity, respectively.
The loan loss provision ratio (llp) is deﬁned as the ratio of a bank’s loan loss reserve
over its total lending. The loan loss reserves comprise speciﬁc allowances for bad
debts, unidentiﬁed loss reserves and provisions for bad debts. As the non-performing
loan ratio (npl) we calculate the nominal value of audited non-performing loans over
all audited lending. Thus, the non-performing loan ratio only refers to the part of
the loan portfolio which was audited while the loan loss provision ratio refers to
the whole loan portfolio. The bank’s eﬃciency is measured with the help of the
personnel intensity (pers). This variable is expressed as the bank’s average number
of personnel divided by the bank’s total assets in million euros.
Note that we relied on economically motivated rather than on regulatory variables.
That is, we prefer the capital ratio over the regulatory capital ratio and total assets
over risk weighted assets. As we estimate risk and return ﬁgures which are derived
from balance sheet data, we feel that one should rather use balance sheet variables
as the capital ratio in stead of regulatory variables as the BIS capital ratio for our
estimations.
In Table 1, we give an overview of the relevant variables and display their summary
statistics.
3 In some empirical analyses the regulatory capital ratio is preferred over the capital ratio derived
from balance sheet data. However, as we explicitly estimate return and risk variables that are
based on balance sheet data, we do not follow this view.




Total assets in million e
1993-2003 1,810 174 15,700 0 742,000
1993 884 104 6,350 0 191,000
2003 3,310 345 25,300 4 742,000
Capital ratio
1993-2003 5.42% 4.78% 4.60% -1.32% 98.80%
1993 4.96% 4.33% 4.64% 0.00% 96.16%
2003 6.01% 5.37% 4.90% 0.00% 93.08%
Return on assets
1993-2003 0.28% 0.26% 0.97% -87.07% 32.87%
1993 0.35% 0.31% 0.48% -7.04% 12.73%
2003 0.17% 0.22% 1.76% -54.01% 16.33%
Return on equity
1993-2003 5.42% 5.36% 13.66% -1.257.20% 1.136.70%
1993 7.25% 7.11% 4.10% -54.74% 68.34%
2003 3.64% 4.05% 17.18% -644.84% 316.57%
Personnel intensity
1993-2003 0.33 0.31 2.00 0.00 347.60
1993 0.41 0.33 6.25 0.00 347.60
2003 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.00 6.92
Loan loss provision ratio
1993-2003 2.13% 1.74% 2.23% 0.00% 95.78%
1993 2.42% 3.21% 3.21% 0.00% 66.26%
2003 2.26% 1.98% 1.71% 0.00% 30.16%
Non-performing loan ratio
1993-2003 22.14% 18.94% 15.61% 0.00% 100.00%
1993 24.92% 21.94% 16.80% 0.00% 100.00%
2003 19.69% 16.75% 14.03% 0.00% 100.00%
74 Diversiﬁcation and Risk-Return-Characteristics
In this section, we discuss the relation of the bank’s diversiﬁcation to the bank’s
performance and to its risk. Theoretically, it is not clear whether or not diversiﬁca-
tion in the banks’ loan portfolios leads to higher expected returns and/or to lower
risk.
In Subsection 4.1 we deﬁne our notion of diversiﬁcation and we present the measures
of diversiﬁcation that we will employ in the empirical study. Then we discuss the
theoretical arguments in favor and against diversiﬁcation beneﬁts and we show em-
pirical approaches of how to test for possible eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on the bank’s
return (Subsection 4.2) and on the bank’s risk (Subsection 4.3), respectively.
4.1 Heuristic Concepts of Diversiﬁcation
Classical portfolio theory in the sense of Markowitz (1952) states that a portfolio is
well diversiﬁed if there is no portfolio which has, at the same time, lower risk and at
least as much expected return. However, this concept cannot be transferred easily
to loan portfolios for the following reasons: i) The classical portfolio theory is based
on mean-variance-eﬃciency. However, the return distribution of loan portfolios is
highly skewed so that the variance is an inappropriate risk measure and the mean-
variance-concept is no longer justiﬁed on the basis of the expected utility theory.
ii) Even if the mean-variance framework were appropriate for loan portfolios, the
problem to estimate the necessary input parameters would remain. In order to
determine the composition of mean-variance eﬃcient portfolios one needs, among
others, the correlations of the portfolio’s assets; but the correlations among loans
cannot be estimated precisely, at least with the limited data which we usually have.
Accepting the inappropriateness of the Markowitz-concept in this context, we resort
to more heuristic concepts and we use the loan portfolio concentration and the loan
portfolio’s distance to a benchmark as diversiﬁcation measures.
In the context of classical portfolio theory an investor invests his money into diﬀerent
assets; in the context of our paper the bank originates loans to diﬀerent industries,
8i.e. in our case the loans granted to ﬁrms of one industry are seen as one asset. Thus,
when referring to diversiﬁcation we mean the diversiﬁcation across industries.4 The
industry is often considered to be the most important factor when explaining stock
or bond volatilities.5 Talking about bank lending, the industry is considered to be
a key factor when estimating the riskiness of a loan.
Let X
b,t
i be the nominal exposure of bank b at time t to industry i with i = 1,...,n.
x
b,t











Sometimes we calculate the diversiﬁcation relative to the naively diversiﬁed portfolio,
sometimes the diversiﬁcation is determined relative to a benchmark portfolio. In the
latter case, yt
i with i = 1,...,n denotes the share of the industry i in the benchmark
portfolio.6
In our study, we will use four diﬀerent measures of diversiﬁcation (specialization):
the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl-Index (HHI), the Shannon Entropy (SE), an absolut dis-
tance measure (Da, the normalised sum of diﬀerences) and a relative distance mea-
sure (Dr, the average relative diﬀerence).
The HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. The HHI of







Note that the lower limit for the HHI is 1/n and is attained when exposures to
all industries are equal. The HHI is equal to 1 when all loans are granted to one
industry.
Entropy measures are also powerful instruments to indicate variety in distributions
at a given point in time. Their potential applications include measuring industrial
4 Due to data restrictions we cannot control for name concentration within the industries.
5 See for instance Roll (1992).
6 When later deﬁning the measures, we suppress the superscripts b,t and t for simplicity.
9concentration or corporate diversiﬁcation.7 We apply the Shannon entropy8 (SE) in










If all loans are handed out to one industry, the measure SE is equal to 0, representing
maximum focus. Perfect naive diversiﬁcation is expressed by a value of −ln(n).
Describing a loan portfolio composition as the (normalized) vector of relative indus-
try shares, the measures Da and Dr can be used to quantify the distance between
a bank’s loan portfolio x and the benchmark’s loan portfolio y. In this setting, di-
versiﬁcation is at its maximum when a bank’s loan portfolio composition perfectly
reﬂects the industry shares of the benchmark portfolio.10 The normalized sum of
















Note that both distance measures are normalized to the interval [0,1]. Da is a
normalized version of the arithmetic mean of the absolute diﬀerences (therefore Da)
across all segments. It can be interpreted as the proportion of a bank’s portfolio
x which would have to be rearranged in order to achieve the composition of the
benchmark portfolio. The measure Dr is based on relative diﬀerences
|xi−yi|
xi+yi .11 The
relative measure Dr has the property that the deviation in each segment is seen
relative to the size of this segment. However, this measures comes along with a
disadvantage when some of the segments are not relevant (that is xi = 0). Each
7 See Frenken (2005).
8 See Shannon (1948).
9 Please note that limxi→0 xi · ln( 1
xi) = 0. See Theil (1972).
10 For some basic properties of distance measures see Pﬁngsten and Rudolph (2002).
11 More precisely the relative diﬀerences should be called relative absolute diﬀerences as they are
calculated from absolute values.
10segment i with xi = 0 contributes 1/n towards the distance measure, irrespective of
the related yi.
As suggested by Pﬁngsten and Rudolph (2002) the industry composition of the
economy’s loan market portfolio can be used as a benchmark for statistical diversi-
ﬁcation. However, this benchmark neglects regional business structures. If the loan
portfolio of a bank reﬂects the industry structure of its region, than a decline in
distance of an individual bank to the national market loan portfolio might be due
to a change in regional industry structures. Based on this argument Kamp et al.
(2005) argue that one should also use regional benchmarks when measuring loan
portfolio diversiﬁcation. Therefore, our analysis also comprises the distance of an
individual bank’s loan portfolio to the state’s loan portfolio. We apply these two
benchmarks as reference points for diversiﬁcation:12




2. composition by industry of a state’s loan market portfolio (DState
a and DState
r )
As for all measures high values stand for specialization while low values stand for
diversiﬁcation, it is more intuitive to refer to the measures as specialization measures
(sm) rather than diversiﬁcation measures.
4.2 Diversiﬁcation and Return
Standard capital market theory states that there is a tradeoﬀ between risk and re-
turn:13 the more risk one is willing to accept the more return can be expected.
However, this tradeoﬀ only holds true for the unsystematic risk, not for the risk
12 Kamp et al. (2005) suggest two more benchmarks: composition by industry of a county’s
loan portfolio and composition by industries of the GNP. Although these benchmarks are not
explicitly considered in this paper, all analysis were also performed with theses alternative
benchmarks. However, the results are quite similar to the results presented in this paper. For
more details on these analysis see Kamp (2006).
13 See Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1964).
11that can theoretically be avoided by diversiﬁcation. Financial theory therefore pre-
dicts that well diversiﬁed banks yield higher expected returns than banks with little
diversiﬁcation.
However, ﬁnancial theory based on the notion of perfect capital markets is not
really applicable for banks. This argument leads to the theory of ﬁnancial interme-
diation, taking into account the role of asymmetric information which incorporates
the relevance of monitoring. Industry expertise goes along with superior monitoring
abilities. Thus, a specialization in loan origination might be superior to diversiﬁca-
tion as specialized banks might be more eﬃcient in monitoring loans than diversiﬁed
banks. In the Diamond (1984) model monitoring costs and monitoring quality are
considered to be constant across all banks. Therefore not surprisingly Diamond
(1984) argues that diversiﬁcation reduces the bank’s monitoring costs and banks
should be as diversiﬁed as possible. Explicitly taking into account that monitoring
costs and quality depend on a bank’s sector expertise, Winton (1999) shows, that
specialization might be the superior strategy. According to this view we expect a
negative relation between the return of the bank and the degree of diversiﬁcation.
There is another argument in favor of focussed banks: Banks that aim at expanding
their business activities rapidly, for instance by lending to ﬁrms from industries un-
known to the bank so far, run the risk that they attract those ﬁrms to whom banks
with more experience would not lend (winner’s curse).
It is not clear which of the eﬀects mentioned above dominates. In our empirical
study, we will estimate the following ﬁxed eﬀects panel regressions to see whether
the relation between the bank’s return and its degree of specialization in the loan
portfolio is positive or negative:14
roa















14 The Hausman test (Hausman (1978)) reveals a violation of the assumptions of the random
eﬀects model. Thus, we use ﬁxed eﬀects estimations.
12In the equations above, roab,t and roeb,t denote the return on assets and the return
on equity of bank b at time t, smb,t−1 is a specialization measure15 of bank b at time
t − 1 and the vector zb,t−1 contains bank speciﬁc variables representing the bank’s
risk, its capitalization and its size.16 µb and λt capture bank individual and time
individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
We control for the bank size, as, based on the better scale eﬃciency of big banks,
theoretical and empirical works reveal a positive linkage of bank size and return.17
As high capital puﬀers are more expensive than collecting deposits, we also control
for the capital ratio. Moreover, the personnel intensity might inﬂuence the return
as a high personnel intensity goes along with high costs. Finally, we control for the
bank risk, as risk and return are assumed to be positively linked. Bank individual
ﬁxed eﬀects are used in order to control for all eﬀects which do not change over
time for individual banks. The time dummies are used to control for time eﬀects as
macroeconomic or structural changes in the data.
If the beneﬁts of specialization outweigh the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, we expect β
to be positive. Accordingly, the coeﬃcient β is negative, if it pays for the banks to
diversify its loan origination across industries.
4.3 Diversiﬁcation and Risk
In the sense of Markowitz diversiﬁcation is a means to change the risk of a portfolio.
Keeping monitoring abilities and monitoring costs constant, the default risk of a
bank is likely to decrease when a bank’s loan portfolio gets better diversiﬁed. This
view seems to be predominant in the German banking act (Kreditwesengesetz) stip-
ulating that a bank’s sum of large loans is limited to eight times the bank’s liable
capital.18
15 Note, that we refer to the measures HHI, SE, Da and Dr as specialization measures as high
values stand for specialization while low values represent diversiﬁcation.
16 Accordingly, γ is a column vector of coeﬃcients with the same size as the vector zb,t.
17 For empirical evidence of German banks see for instance Lang and Welzel (1997).
18 See § 13 Kreditwesengesetz (KWG). A loan is deﬁned as large if the total exposure to the
borrower exceeds 10 percent of the bank’s liable capital. Apparently, this is an issue of name
rather than industry concentration.
13Winton (1999) shows that diversiﬁcation does not need to lower the banks’ default
risk. This model result is based on the idea that specialized banks can beneﬁt
from their screening and monitoring advantages. However, it must be taken into
consideration that the results of the model rely to some degree on the assumption
that there are only two sectors in the model economy. Thus, within the Winton
model diversiﬁcation is an ”all or nothing” decision.
As for the relationship of diversiﬁcation and return there seems to be a tradeoﬀ be-
tween the beneﬁts from risk diversiﬁcation and specialization. Thus, we empirically
investigate the relationship of risk and loan portfolio diversiﬁcation.
While return ﬁgures can easily be derived from balance sheet data it is by far less
clear how the risk of a bank’s loan portfolio should be estimated.19 A common
approach to measure the bank’s risk is to use the loan loss provision ratio (llp) or
the non-performing loan ratio (npl). Acharya et al. (2004) refer to these ratios as a
measure for the bank’s risk in the loan portfolio. They admit that this interpretation
is questionable: The risk of a loan portfolio is its unexpected loss, not the losses that
are expected. However, the denominators of the loan loss provision ratio and of the
non-performing loan ratio are also determined by losses that were expected when
originating the loans. Theses expected losses should be reﬂected in a risk-adjusted
pricing and therefore not be considered as risk. Consequently, in our study, we do
not only measure the risk in the bank’s loan portfolio by the loan loss provision ratio
and the non-performing loan ratio but also by the ﬂuctuation of these variables in
the course of time, i.e. we deﬁne the variables σllp and σnpl as the standard deviations
of a bank’s loan loss provision ratio and non-performing loan ratio, respectively, in
the course of time.
Using the loan loss provision ratio and the non-performing loan ratio as measures
for risk we run the following ﬁxed eﬀects panel regressions:20
llp







19 These return data may, of course, be inﬂuenced by accounting practices.
20 Again, the Hausman test (Hausman (1978)) reveals a violation of the assumptions of the
random eﬀects model. Thus, we use ﬁxed eﬀects estimations.
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In the regressions above, llpb,t and nplb,t denote the loan loss provision ratios and
the non-performing loan ratios of bank b at time t, sm is one of our specialization
measures, and z is a vector of control variables. Again, µb and λt represent bank
individual and time individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
We control for the bank size, as due to the too-big-to-fail phenomenon, big banks
tend to have a higher risk. As regulatory capital requirements aim to create a
positive linkage between loan losses and capital requirements, we also control for the
capital ratio. The personnel intensity is used as a measure of monitoring quality,
because monitoring is rather personal intensive. Finally, the return on assets is
used as a control variable, as one would expect a relationship between the bank risk
(as measured by the loan loss provision ratio and non-performing loan ratio) and
a bank’s return. Bank individual ﬁxed eﬀects are used in order to control for all
eﬀects which do not change over time for individual banks. The time dummies are
used to control for time eﬀects as macroeconomic or structural changes in the data.
Whenever risk is deﬁned as σllp or σnpl, we only have one observation for each bank




llp = α + β · smb + γ




npl = α + β · smb + γ
0 · zb + ε
b (11)
In the regression above, σb
llp and σb
npl denote the standard deviation of a bank’s loan
loss provision ratio and the standard deviation of a bank’s non-performing loan ratio
over all observations. smb is the serial average of a specialization measure for bank
b and zb is a vector of serial averages of control variables for bank b. Note that the
regressions (10) and (11) are purely cross-sectional, whereas the regressions (6) to
(9) have a time and a cross-sectional dimension. Equations (10) and (11) have no
15time dimension because the variables σb
llp and σb
npl are estimated from the banks’
time series.
As pointed out in Subsection 4.1, the specialization measures sm are deﬁned such
that high degrees of specialization are associated with high values while low values
stand for diversiﬁcation. Therefore, we expect a positive sign for the coeﬃcient β,
if diversiﬁcation tends to reduce the risk of a bank. On the other hand, if focussed
banks tend to identify eﬀectively the low-risk borrowers and thereby reduce their
risk, we will ﬁnd a negative relation between the banks’ risk and their specialization
measure.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we will present the results of regressions 6 through 11. We start with
the estimations of the return on assets and the return on equity.
5.1 Diversiﬁcation and Return
The results of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimations of the return on assets (Equation 6) are
presented in Table 2. These estimations aim at analyzing the relationship between
specialization and return, controlling for the bank size (log(ta)), the capital ratio
(cap), the personnel intensity (pers) as well as the loan loss provision ratio (llp) as
a proxy for a bank’s risk.
Each column in Table 2 represents the results for the estimation depending on the
specialization measure used. Thus, the ﬁrst column shows the results for using
the HHI as specialization measure (sm). The upper ﬁgure of each cell in the table
depicts the coeﬃcient of the respective variable while the lower ﬁgure represents
the corresponding t-statistic. From the ﬁrst line in Table 2 we can see that the
coeﬃcients for all specialization measures but DNation
r are positive. The coeﬃcients
for the entropy measure as well as for DState
r are signiﬁcantly positive. As far as the
concentration measures (HHI and SE) are concerned, one can identify a positive link






sm 0.00141 0.00161 0.00014 -0.00015 0.00167 0.00206
1.62 4.12*** 0.15 -0.17 1.34 1.64*
log(ta) -0.00076 -0.00060 -0.00077 -0.00078 -0.00060 -0.00053
-2.72*** -2.14** -2.76*** -2.78*** -1.97** -1.70**
cap -0.01917 -0.01998 -0.01899 -0.01903 -0.02782 -0.02771
-6.41*** -6.66*** -6.35*** -6.36*** -7.82*** -7.80***
pers -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
-0.42 -0.37 -0.44 -0.44 -0.49 -0.49
llp -0.01046 -0.01015 -0.01045 -0.01046 -0.01208 -0.01232
-2.50** -2.43** -2.49** -2.50** -2.85*** -2.92***
***,**,* indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively. sm:
specialization measure, log(ta): natural logarithm of total assets, cap: capital ratio, pers:
personnel intensity, llp: loan loss provision ratio.
between an concentrated loan portfolio and a bank’s return on assets. This positive
linkage is not conﬁrmed for the distance measures using the national loan portfolio
as a benchmark. However, using the states’ loan portfolios as a benchmark one can
see a slightly positive relationship between the level of specialization and the return
on assets.
The results for the control variables are rather homogenous. For the bank size,
expressed by the natural logarithm of total assets, we ﬁnd a negative relationship in
all estimates. That is: big banks tend to have a lower return on assets than small
banks. This result is somewhat surprising. In the theoretical literature we ﬁnd
two basic arguments why big banks should have higher returns than small banks.
The ﬁrst argument is that big banks beneﬁt from economies of scale. Secondly,
some theoretical papers claim that big banks beneﬁt from a better diversiﬁcation
17as increasing size goes along with increasing diversiﬁcation.21 However, explicitly
considering the level of diversiﬁcation in modelling the bank return reveals that there
are rather negative beneﬁts from the bank size alone.22 These negative economies
of scale could for instance be a result of increasing complexity. This ﬁnding excites
the idea of explicitly considering the level of loan portfolio diversiﬁcation when
estimating bank eﬃciency.23
The coeﬃcients of the capital ratio are signiﬁcantly negative in all estimations.
Thus, banks with a high capital ratio reveal a rather low return on assets. This
result is not surprising, as equity is more expensive than deposits.
The personnel intensity does not show a signiﬁcant impact on the estimation while
the coeﬃcients of the loan loss provision ratio are signiﬁcantly negative in all esti-
mations. Thus, high loan loss provisions go along with a low return on assets. If
one takes into consideration that building a loan loss provision directly decreases
the proﬁt, this result is not surprising. However, if one interprets the loan loss pro-
vision as a proxy for the bank risk, this result does not reﬂect the expectation that
high risks should go along with a high expected return. This point underlines the
criticism of using the loan loss provision ratio as a variable to measure risk.24, 25
So far, we have used the return on assets when estimating banks’ returns. The
results of the estimation of the return on equity corresponding to Equation (7)
21 See for instance Krasa and Villamil (1992) or McFadden (2005).
22 This result hints at an interaction between bank size and the level of diversiﬁcation. However,
adding a corresponding interaction term into Equations (6) and (7) does not reveal a signiﬁcant
impact. Following Friedrich (1982) non-signiﬁcant interaction terms are not taken into further
consideration.
23 Such estimations of bank eﬃciency are out of the scope of this paper.
24 We get very similar results when using the non-performing loan ratio as a proxy for risk in
Equations 6 and 7.
25 Given the criticism of using the loan loss provision ratio and the non-performing loan ratio
as control variables for risk, one could also use σllp or σnpl as variables in Equations 6 and 7
in order to control for risk. However, as we only have one observation for each bank the risk
measures would be perfectly multicollinear with the bank-individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, if one
wanted to consider σllp or σnpl as risk variables in order to estimate the return on assets or the
return on equity, one would need to apply a random eﬀects estimation. Such random eﬀects
estimations reveal a signiﬁcantly positive relationship between the level of specialization and the
banks’ return for all six measures of specialization. However, one has to take into consideration
that the assumptions of the random eﬀects model are violated. Therefore, the results of these
estimations are not depicted in detail.
18are shown in Table 3. Again, we see a positive relationship between the level of
loan portfolio concentration, as deﬁned by HHI and SE, and the return ﬁgure. All
distance measures show a positive but non-signiﬁcant linkage of specialization and
return. The results for the control variables are in line with the results from Table
2 and are therefore not discussed in detail.






sm 0.03018 0.01238 0.02327 0.02399 0.01450 0.02414
1.92* 1.75* 1.34 1.46 0.68 1.12
log(ta) -0.02018 -0.01921 -0.01999 -0.01949 -0.01608 -0.01509
-4.02*** -3.78*** -3.97*** -3.84*** -3.10*** -2.85***
cap -0.26384 -0.26781 -0.25817 -0.25611 -0.34379 -0.34314
-4.88*** -4.94*** -4.77*** -4.73*** -5.63*** -5.62***
pers -0.00011 -0.00010 -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00011
-0.26 -0.25 -0.25 -0.26 -0.28 -0.28
llp -0.23477 -0.23227 -0.23345 -0.23378 -0.23560 -0.23759
-3.10*** -3.07*** -3.08*** -3.09*** -3.24*** -3.27***
***,**,* indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively. sm:
specialization measure, log(ta): natural logarithm of total assets, cap: capital ratio, pers:
personnel intensity, llp: loan loss provision ratio.
We can sum up, that there is a weak positive linkage between the level of specializa-
tion and the return of German banks. Thus, specialized banks tend to have higher
returns than their diversiﬁed competitors. This ﬁnding especially holds when the
level of specialization is measured with concentration measures whereas the positive
linkage between the distance to the national loan market and states’ loan markets
is by and large non-signiﬁcant.
195.2 Diversiﬁcation and Risk
Now, we turn to the relationship between loan portfolio diversiﬁcation and bank risk.
We begin our analysis with the results of the estimations of the loan loss provision
ratio as described by Equation (8). Table 4 shows the results.






sm 0.00034 -0.00154 -0.00312 -0.00093 -0.01306 -0.00220
0.26 -2.64*** -2.17** -0.68 -7.16*** -1.20
log(ta) 0.00227 0.00210 0.00219 0.00223 0.00196 0.00226
5.41*** 4.94*** 5.21*** 5.25*** 4.32*** 4.87***
cap -0.00336 -0.00243 -0.00372 -0.00352 -0.01111 -0.01227
-0.72 -0.52 -0.80 -0.76 -2.05** -2.26**
pers 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
0.30 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.33
roa -0.20527 -0.20344 -0.20335 -0.20468 -0.22955 -0.23498
-11.80*** -11.70*** -11.69*** -11.77*** -11.81*** -12.08***
***,**,* indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively. sm:
specialization measure, log(ta): natural logarithm of total assets, cap: capital ratio, pers:
personnel intensity, roa: return on assets.
For all specialization measures but the HHI we see negative coeﬃcients. The coeﬃ-
cients of the two absolute distance measures and the entropy measure are statistically
signiﬁcant. When measuring specialization with these measures, specialized banks
tend to have lower loan loss provision ratios than diversiﬁed banks.
Again, the results for the control variables are rather homogenous. For the bank size
we observe highly signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients. Thus, bigger banks tend to have
a higher loan loss provision ratio than smaller banks. This ﬁnding is in line with
theoretical and empirical papers dealing with the too-big-to-fail phenomenon.26
26 See for instance Boyd and Runkle (1993) and De Nicol´ o (2001).
20The coeﬃcients of the capital ratio are negative. This relationship is signiﬁcant in
the estimations using DState
a and DState
r . High loan loss provision ratios go along
with low capital ratios. This ﬁnding is somewhat surprising as bank regulation
aims at creating a positive linkage of the bank risk and the capital requirements.
However, under Basel I the capital requirements are not really linked to the riskiness
of lending.
As an alternative to the loan loss provision ratio we apply the non-performing loan
ratio as a measure of bank risk, which is estimated by Equation 9. The results of
this estimation are shown in Table 5.






sm -0.05093 -0.02439 -0.03554 -0.02377 -0.22800 -0.06464
-4.12*** -4.49*** -2.65*** -1.86* -13.67*** -3.84***
log(ta) 0.05042 0.04837 0.05018 0.04995 0.05140 0.05497
12.99*** 12.33*** 12.89*** 12.74*** 12.41*** 12.93***
cap 0.11907 0.12758 0.10795 0.10661 0.15592 0.12660
2.71*** 2.90*** 2.46** 2.42** 3.06*** 2.47**
pers -0.00012 -0.00013 -0.00012 -0.00011 -0.00017 -0.00011
-0.36 -0.39 -0.37 -0.35 -0.55 -0.36
roa -1.39416 -1.39259 -1.40243 -1.41313 -1.49916 -1.60027
-8.21*** -8.20*** -8.25*** -8.32*** -7.91*** -8.41***
***,**,* indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively. sm:
specialization measure, log(ta): natural logarithm of total assets, cap: capital ratio, pers:
personnel intensity, roa: return on assets.
This time all coeﬃcients of the applied specialization measures are signiﬁcantly
negative, but at diﬀerent levels. Specialized banks have on average a lower ratio of
non-performing loans than diversiﬁed banks. A possible explanation for this ﬁnding
is that specialization helps to improve the monitoring abilities of banks.
21The results for the control variables bank size, personal intensity and return on
assets are not discussed in detail as they are very similar to the results from table 4.
However, the results for the capital ratio should be given some attention. In contrast
to Table 4, all coeﬃcients of the capital ratio are now positive and even signiﬁcant.
A high ratio of non-performing loans goes along with a high capital ratio. This is
what one would expect from the idea of regulatory capital requirements.
To sum up, we ﬁnd that specialized banks are characterized by lower ratios of loan
loss provisions and non performing loans as diversiﬁed banks. If one interprets
these ratios as risk ﬁgures one would conclude that specialization in lending tends
to go along with an improvement of the bank performance, expressed by higher
returns and lower risks. This would mean that the beneﬁts of specialization outweigh
the beneﬁts of risk diversiﬁcation. However, this argumentation is based on the
assumption that the loan loss provision ratio as well as the non-performing loan ratio
reﬂect the bank risk. As discussed before, these ﬁgures depend to some degree on
loan defaults that were already expected when originating loans. Expected defaults
are taken into consideration when pricing loans and can therefore not be considered
as risk. Next, we therefore use the standard deviation of the loan loss provision ratio
and the non-performing loan ratio as proxies for unexpected losses.
The results for the estimation based on Equation (10), using σllp as dependent vari-
able, are shown in Table 6. Remember that we apply a between-groups estimation
as we only have one observation of σllp for each bank. Thus, the explanatory vari-
ables are condensed to the group means. The group mean of a variable is the mean
of all observations of a bank b over the given time horizon.
For all specialization measures we ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients. Thus,
specialized banks tend to have a higher ﬂuctuation of their loan loss provisions over
time as diversiﬁed banks. This is an indicator, that diversiﬁed banks are less risky
than specialized banks.
Again, we ﬁnd that the bank size is positively linked to the risk measure as predicted
by theoretical papers dealing with the too-big-to-fail phenomenon. For the capital
ratio we observe negative coeﬃcients as already seen in Table 4. All coeﬃcients of






sm 0.00752 0.00256 0.00977 0.00998 0.00916 0.01001
6.41*** 6.98*** 7.26*** 7.47*** 6.90*** 7.16***
log(ta) 0.00011 0.00024 0.00046 0.00056 0.00043 0.00060
1.00 2.10** 3.81*** 4.42*** 3.32*** 4.33***
cap -0.00675 -0.00671 -0.00501 -0.00486 -0.00392 -0.00353
-1.76* -1.78* -1.37 -1.34 -0.89 -0.81
pers -0.00009 -0.00010 -0.00013 -0.00010 -0.00011 -0.00008
-0.56 -0.58 -0.80 -0.62 -0.65 -0.49
roa -0.26598 -0.26600 -0.26535 -0.26442 -0.31550 -0.31568
-13.51*** -13.52*** -13.50*** -13.46*** -14.59*** -14.60***
llp 0.33083 0.33162 0.33288 0.33332 0.33233 0.33182
43.48*** 43.60*** 43.71*** 43.76*** 42.92*** 42.94***
***,**,* indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively. sm:
specialization measure, log(ta): natural logarithm of total assets, cap: capital ratio, pers:
personnel intensity, roa: return on assets, llp: loan loss provision ratio.
the return on assets are highly signiﬁcant and negative. This ﬁnding is in line with
our results from Tables 4 and 5. As risk and return are expected to be positively
linked, this ﬁnding is surprising. Our observations indicate that high risks in lending
do not go along with high returns and therefore support Hayden et al. (2005) who
state that ”German banks are not risk-return eﬃcient”. Finally we control for the
loan loss provision ratio when estimating σllp. The coeﬃcients of the loan loss
provision ratio are highly signiﬁcant and positive, which means high ratios of loan
loss provisions tend to go along with high ﬂuctuations of the ratio.
The results for the estimation based on Equation (11), using σnpl as risk measure, are
shown in Table 7. They are very similar to the results from Table 6. However, one
striking exception applies. The coeﬃcients of the personnel intensity are signiﬁcantly






sm 0.06510 0.01957 0.05785 0.05986 0.04505 0.04547
10.19*** 9.74*** 7.79*** 8.10*** 6.27*** 6.01***
log(ta) 0.00493 0.00588 0.00700 0.00760 0.00658 0.00725
8.22*** 9.67*** 10.61*** 11.05*** 9.78*** 9.92***
cap -0.02349 -0.01272 0.01619 0.01628 -0.00510 -0.00024
-1.11 -0.61 0.79 0.80 -0.21 -0.01
pers -0.00200 -0.00206 -0.00230 -0.00214 -0.00193 -0.00179
-2.24** -2.30** -2.55** -2.38** -2.19** -2.03**
roa -0.38456 -0.38533 -0.38298 -0.37745 -0.46458 -0.46701
-3.55*** -3.55*** -3.51*** -3.47*** -4.01*** -4.03***
npl 0.23686 0.23894 0.23778 0.23883 0.23187 0.23074
32.69*** 32.74*** 32.28*** 32.38*** 31.16*** 31.10***
***,**,* indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively. sm:
specialization measure, log(ta): natural logarithm of total assets, cap: capital ratio, pers:
personnel intensity, roa: return on assets, npl: non-performing loan ratio.
negative in all estimations. Thus, banks with a high personnel intensity tend to
have lower ﬂuctuations of the non-performing loan ratio. A possible explanation
for this observation is that a high personnel intensity could go along with high
monitoring resources, helping to increase the quality of monitoring and smoothing
the ﬂuctuation of non-performing loans. However, based in this reasoning we should
also see signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients of the personnel intensity in Table 6 which
is not the case. The coeﬃcients are negative but all non-signiﬁcant.
To sum up the results from this subsection, we ﬁnd that specialized banks tend to
have lower ratios of loan loss provisions as well as lower ratios of non-performing
loans as diversiﬁed banks. However, they also reveal signiﬁcantly higher ﬂuctuations
of these ratios over time than their diversiﬁed competitors, indicating that special-
24ized banks have a higher risk than diversiﬁed banks. In combination with our results
from Subsection 5.1 this means, that the question of loan portfolio diversiﬁcation
versus loan portfolio specialization depicts the typical tradeoﬀ of risk and return.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the tradeoﬀ between the beneﬁts of loan portfolios diversiﬁca-
tion and the beneﬁt from specialization of loan portfolios. To this end we calculate a
broad set of heuristic measures of loan portfolio specialization. These measures are
used to estimate risk and return ﬁgures, that were taken from the banks’ balance
sheets and audit reports. Our database comprises all German banks from 1993 to
2003.
We can show that specialized banks tend to have slightly higher returns than their
diversiﬁed competitors. At the same time specialized banks reveal lower ratios
of loan loss provisions and non-performing loans. These ﬁndings indicate that the
beneﬁts of specialization outweigh the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation. However, using the
ﬂuctuation of the loan loss ratio and the ﬂuctuation of the non-performing loan ratio
as proxies for unexpected losses, we ﬁnd that specialized banks are characterized by
a higher volatility of these ratios, indicating a higher level of risk. This means
that the question of diversiﬁcation versus specialization portrays a picture of typical
risk-return tradeoﬀ, conﬁrming a conclusion by Elyasiani and Deng (2004) for more
coarse U.S. data.
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